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Abstract: This paper analyses the security threats that can arise against an Active 
Directory server when it is included in a Web application. The approach is 
based on the STRIDE classification methodology. The paper also provides  
outline descriptions of countermeasures that can be deployed to protect against 
the different threats and vulnerabilities identified here. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Active Directory (AD) is Microsoft’s LDAP product offering, first 
introduced with Windows 2000 servers. Whilst being reasonably conformant 
to many of the LDAP set of standards e.g. [1,2,3], nevertheless it is non-
conformant in some aspects. For example, it does not support some 
standardized features, such as multi-valued relative distinguished names 
(RDNs) or country based naming, but it does support many proprietary 
features, such as a tight coupling with the operating system and Microsoft’s 
DNS server. It has also replaced several standardized features with its own 
proprietary ones. For these reasons customers using Microsoft’s operating 
systems are well advised not to try to replace Active Directory with an 
alternative more standards’ conformant LDAP product such as OpenLDAP. 
Active Directory is a core service holding user and server account details 
and security information. For example, Windows authentication uses 
credentials stored in the Active Directory. Active Directory is therefore 
fundamental to the correct operation of a Microsoft domain. For this reason 
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most Microsoft based Web applications will need to access Active Directory 
either directly or indirectly at some point during their business processing, 
often during the authentication and/or authorization phases, but also at 
different stages of the business process. 
Access to Active Directory therefore needs to be well controlled and 
protected, otherwise an attacker could severely impair the correct 
functioning of both the Web application and the back office by successfully 
launching an attack on Active Directory. Web application builders need to 
understand the vulnerabilities of Active Directory and the threats that can 
potentially exploit these vulnerabilities. In common with the other papers in 
this series [4, 5, 6, 7] we use the STRIDE approach [8] to categorize the 
most frequent or damaging threats that can arise against Active Directory 
when deployed as part of the generic model for Web applications described 
in [9]. Finally we describe the countermeasures that can be used to prevent 
these threats or to mitigate against the damages subsequent to a successful 
attack. 
2. ASSUMPTIONS 
The guidelines discussed in this paper will be effective only if the Active 
Directory is properly installed, configured and patched with the latest 
updates and service packs as released by Microsoft. 
Correct configuration requires that that the Access Control Lists (ACLs), 
that are used to control access to objects in the Active Directory, are set up 
to give minimum privileges to the users (and to the Application Server 
acting as a user or a proxy for the users).   
The assumption is that the Application Server will communicate with the 
Active Directory server by RPC messages generated by the Active Directory 
Service Interfaces (ADSI), using one of the various scripting or 
programming languages that it supports e.g. C++, Visual Basic or Java.  
It is assumed that there is only a limited amount of trust between the 
Active Directory Server and the Application Server, and between the 
Application Server and the Web Server. By this, we mean that the Active 
Directory Server will not let the Application Server have unrestricted access 
to its resources, but will impose some controls on what the Application 
Server can do. For example, the AD server may have an administrative limit 
on the number of LDAP entries that can be returned to any ADSI request; 
the AD server may have controls on the complexity and number of filter 
items that can be included in a Search filter; and the AD server will have 
properly configured access controls that limit which directory entries and 
which operations the Application Server (and its users) are allowed to 
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access. Likewise, the Application Server will have some controls on the 
messages originating from the Web Server and will validate and restrict their 
contents. From a security perspective, the less trust that there is between the 
AD server and the Application Server, and between the latter and the Web 
Server, the better, as more controls will be imposed by the AD server on 
what the Application Server is allowed to do, and by the Application Server 
on what the Web Server can do. For example, at one extreme the AD server 
may forbid any modification operations to originate from the Application 
Server. The more trust that there is, the more careful the application 
developer will need to be to ensure that this trust is not abused by an 
application server that may become compromised, or that is just badly 
programmed.  
The final assumption is that there is no (or very little) trust between the 
Web Server and the client, or between the Web Server and the network over 
which the client’s http messages are transported. Thus eavesdropping of 
messages on the network is possible, and in extreme cases, message 
modifications. Furthermore, the Web Server must expect the client to try to 
circumvent whatever client controls are placed on the messages that it sends.   
Consequently the Web Server and all subsequent servers that receive client 
messages, for example SOAP messages that are relayed through the Web 
Server, must be designed to protect against threats emanating from modified 
or badly formed client messages, by rigorously validating their contents. 
3. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
We can look at security requirements from two perspectives: the security 
requirements placed on the design of the web application because it has little 
or no trust in the client and the external network, and the security 
requirements placed on the Active Directory because it only has limited trust 
in the web application. 
The security requirements placed on the web application i.e. the web 
server and the Application Server, partially depend upon the type of 
application that is being built. At one extreme, we may have an application 
that is only retrieving public information from the AD server. At the other 
extreme we may have an application that is accessing highly confidential 
directory information and writing to the AD server by adding, modifying and 
deleting objects in the Directory Information Tree (DIT).   
In the former case the web application may have very few security 
requirements placed on it, and may allow unauthenticated user access over 
unsecured http links. Example applications might be: one that accesses the 
contact information of people in the marketing and sales department, or one 
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that retrieves certificate revocation lists (CRLs) for a PKI application.  The 
main security function of the web application will be to validate the contents 
of the client requests (see below) and ensure that only a predefined limited 
set of Search requests, and no modification requests, are sent to the Active 
Directory. 
In the latter case the web application will have very strict security 
requirements placed on it. An example application might be one that 
supports single sign on (SSO) and user authorisation by checking user 
credentials in and retrieving their privileges from the AD server, whilst 
simultaneously supporting dynamic provisioning and management of user 
rights. In such cases, the web application will demand strong authentication 
of the user to prevent masquerade, and will require all messages to be carried 
across encrypted links to protect against eavesdropping and message 
modification. The web application should never request nor accept user 
passwords passed in the clear from the client. This will facilitate password 
capture over an insecure network. The application should always require 
passwords to be sent over an encrypted link e.g. using SSL or IPsec, or use 
HMAC hashing which creates one-time passwords. When using SSL, the 
web server should check that the SSL cipher suite that has been negotiated 
with the client is a minimum of 128 bit encryption, and that it has not been 
negotiated down to plain text (no encryption) or weak encryption. The same 
holds true for the Application Server if it is using an insecure link to 
communicate with the Web Server. In addition rigorous checking and 
validation of all client provided fields and requests should take place as 
described next.  
Preferably, and whenever possible, limit the choices that are available to 
the client by having picking lists of predefined values so that the client 
cannot create its own values (this is very important for attribute type names, 
matching rules, the distinguished names of subtree roots, the name of the AD 
server and its connection details, although the latter of these will usually be 
pre-configured into the Application Server and the client will not have any 
control over them). For fields where the client must usually have complete 
freedom of choice over the input values, for example, attribute values for 
Search filters, then the Application Server should perform rigorous 
validation of these values. Firstly determine the maximum length of each 
field and check that it has not been exceeded by the client. Reject client 
operations in which fields are too long. Secondly, treat each field as a literal 
and make sure that it is encoded as such, for example by enclosing the user’s 
input in quotation marks.  Consider the following: say that the client 
interface had separate input fields for attribute types and values when 
creating a Search filter. The code might put them together to create a filter 
such as  (<user type>=<user value>). An attacker might place the following 
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in the Attribute Type field 
&(objectCategory=person)(!salary>=10000)(commonName 
and the code would then create the following valid complex filter 
(&(objectCategory=person)(!salary>=10000)(commonName=<user value>) 
thereby allowing the attacker to create whatever Search filters they want 
to. Input field validation and checking is thus extremely important. 
Because the Active Directory only has limited trust in the web 
application, the security requirements placed on the Active Directory and on 
the design of the web application are common, regardless of the type of 
application that is being built. Firstly the Active Directory should be 
configured so that the Application Server has no (or very limited) access 
privileges to data in the Active Directory. This will help to protect against 
elevation of privileges, whereby a user gains the access privileges of the 
application rather than his/her own. Secondly the Active Directory should 
limit the types of request from and the volume of data returned to the 
Application Server. Finally, the Application Server should Bind to the 
Active Directory using the client’s user context rather than its own.  
When an application Binds to an object in the Active Directory, the access 
privileges that the application has to that object are based on the user context 
specified during the Bind operation. For the ADSI binding functions and 
methods (IADsOpenDSObject::OpenDSObject, ADsOpenObject, 
ADsGetObject, GetObject) an application can implicitly use the credentials 
of the caller, or explicitly specify the credentials of a user account, or use an 
unauthenticated user context (Guest). The Application Server should never 
Bind to the AD server using a stronger form of authentication than that used 
by the client, nor should it use a user account that has higher privileges than 
the client’s (for example, the LocalSystem account on a domain controller 
has complete access to Active Directory whereas a typical user has only 
limited access to some of the objects in the directory). Ideally, the 
Application Server should either use the credentials provided by the user, 
and validate them by passing them to the AD server either implicitly or 
explicitly, or should discard the user credentials altogether and use the Guest 
context. In the former case the Application Server is acting as a proxy for the 
client and will thus only have the same access rights to the directory data as 
if the client were binding directly. In the latter case, the Application Server 
will only gain minimum/public access rights to the directory data. For 
example, an application policy might say that local users who access the 
Active Directory when they are at a remote site should only have Guest 
access to public data in the directory, in which case their credentials would 




4. ACTIVE DIRECTORY THREATS AND 
COUNTERMEASURES 
4.1 Spoofing 
Spoofing can take one of two forms. Either an attacker attempts to spoof 
a user or an attacker attempts to spoof the Active Directory. In the former 
case the attacker captures or guesses a user’s credentials and then 
masquerades as the user when accessing the Active Directory. In the latter 
case the attacker tricks a client into believing that information came from the 
Active Directory when it did not, or tricks the client into sending 
confidential data to it that should have been sent to the Active Directory. 
Spoofing results from vulnerabilities in the client or in the network. 
Spoofing the directory could be achieved by social engineering (e.g. sending 
a wrong URL to users), misdirecting operations or modifying data in transit. 
The use of SSL links will counteract the latter two, and user education will 
help to protect against social engineering, although this is notoriously 
difficult to fully protect against. 
Spoofing a user can be aided by vulnerabilities in the network, 
vulnerabilities in the Active Directory Information Base and vulnerabilities 
in the Application Server. An attacker can sniff the network to obtain user 
account names and passwords, or access the Active Directory to retrieve 
valid user account names and then find the password by either a dictionary 
attack or modifying the password attribute in the directory. Since the Active 
Directory is often designed to return user account names, it may be difficult 
to stop attackers from gaining this information, but if clients generally don’t 
need to know user account names, then these should not be returned to the 
client interface. The use of encrypted connections such as SSL or IPsec will 
stop network sniffing, as will the use of HMAC [10] or Kerberos 
authentication. Dictionary attacks can be prevented by having the 
Application Server count the number of failed login attempts per user 
account name, writing them to audit trails, and then disabling the account 
when a threshold number is exceeded. Modification of password attributes 
can be prevented by the Application Server not providing a modification 
capability to the client, but if this is essential, then the server should 
carefully validate all modification operations and trap ones that try to modify 
the password attribute. 
4.2 Tampering 
With this threat, an attacker tries to modify directory data either in transit 
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to the client, or whilst it is stored in the AD server. This can be due to 
vulnerabilities in the network, vulnerabilities in the Active Directory 
Information Base or vulnerabilities in the Application Server. Threats to the 
AD server can arise from masquerade, poorly configured access controls and 
the injection of modification operations via the Application Server. 
Countermeasures include protecting data in transit by using either SSL or 
IPsec. Masquerade has been dealt with in Section 4.1. The Application 
Server should be configured to reject all Modification operations, or if this is 
not possible, to very carefully validate all user input fields and to reject 
operations with “invalid” arguments. The Application Server should Bind to 
the AD server using the user provided credentials so that the user does not 
inherit the possibly higher privileges of the Application Server process. 
4.3 Repudiation  
Repudiation is when users deny that they have performed specific actions 
or transactions. Keeping adequate audit trails will provide evidence of who 
did what and will help to counteract this type of threat. Auditing should be 
performed by both the AD server and the Application Server, and in this way 
insider attacks directed straight to the AD server will be more easy to 
identify. Requiring relatively strong client authentication will minimize the 
chances that an attacker can perform actions on behalf of a client which will 
subsequently be repudiated. 
4.4 Information Disclosure 
Information disclosure occurs when a user gains read access to 
information that (s)he is not supposed to have access to. This can be due to 
vulnerabilities in the network, vulnerabilities in the Active Directory or 
vulnerabilities in the Application Server. Vulnerabilities in the AD software, 
other than those caused by badly configured access controls, are outside the 
scope of this document. An attacker may sniff the network, masquerade as 
another user, or generate valid or invalid search or modify requests. Network 
sniffing and masquerade have already been dealt with in section 4.1. 
Generating invalid search or modify requests may return useful error 
diagnostic messages, which can provide the attacker with valuable 
information. The countermeasure to this is for the Application Server to 
scrub useful information from error messages and to return bland generic 
error messages to the client, whilst writing the full error message to its audit 
trail. 
The Application Server should exert control over the Search requests that 
clients can perform. In general only specific limited Searches should be 
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allowed by clients, otherwise attackers may generate very broad searches 
that trawl the entire directory. All user input should be validated, and only a 
fixed subset of ADSI arguments should to be allowed. Searches with 
“invalid” arguments should be rejected. However, a determined attacker may 
even circumvent this by generating multiple valid Search requests that only 
return snippets of information each time. If this is done a sufficient number 
of times, the sum total of information gained by the attacker may be more 
than the application designers ever intended to be revealed. For example, 
retrieving details of individual users in each Search request, may enable an 
attacker to retrieve details of the entire organizational workforce. Such 
attacks are very difficult to stop. Even building an audit trial and refusing 
access after a set number of searches might not stop the problem if the 
attacker has access to multiple user accounts. 
Similarly, the Application Server should exert tight control over 
Modification operations. Ideally, it should refuse to allow any Modification 
operation through the interface, or if this is not possible, it should ensure that 
only authenticated users can perform modification operations, whilst 
simultaneously very carefully validating all user input fields and rejecting 
those with “invalid” arguments. For example, an attacker may try to modify 
the heuristic status of attributes, by setting bit 1 (which will make the 
attribute visible to unauthenticated users) or unsetting bit 3 (which removes 
operational attribute status). 
4.5 Denial of Service 
In a denial of service attack, the attacker denies access to the AD server 
for normal users. This can be aided by vulnerabilities in the Active Directory 
server and vulnerabilities in the Application Server. Denial of Service 
attacks are typically very hard to protect against. 
 The attacker may try to crash the AD server, or more likely, consume 
excessive resources. The easiest way to consume excessive resources is to 
launch CPU or network intensive Search operations. The former can be 
started by creating Searches with inefficient and/or complex filters, or ones 
containing multiple ambiguous name resolution elements (i.e. those where 
the attribute type is set to anr) [11]. Network intensive Searchers are 
designed to return lots of entries – the entire AD contents if possible.  
Countermeasures to the above are as follows. The Application Server 
should validate all filters input by the user and only allow a predefined 
subset of filters to get through. In addition, the AD server should be 
configured to reject complex filters, and to only return a pre-defined 
maximum number of entries for any Search request. 
An attacker may try to open up multiple connections to the Application 
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Server and/or AD server, preferably using SSL which consumes more 
resources. Countermeasures include timing out inactive sessions, keeping a 
record of the usernames of each active session and only allowing a fixed 
number of sessions per user at any one time. 
More sophisticated attacks, which would normally require administrator 
level privileges, include: switching off indexing which kills the performance 
of most search operations; starting replication between AD servers which 
again kills performance; or updating the schema which might actually crash 
the AD server. Careful validation of the allowed modification operations by 
the Application Server should trap operations such as these. 
4.6 Elevation of Privileges 
Elevation of privileges can occur when an attacker either masquerades as 
a user with higher privileges than his own, or modifies data in the directory, 
for example, by adding a user to a group, or modifying ACLs in directory 
objects. Masquerade has already been described in Section 4.1. Illegal 
modification of directory data can be prohibited by disallowing any 
Modification operation to originate from the Application Server, or if this is 
not possible, by very carefully validating all user input fields and rejecting 
operations with “invalid” arguments. Correctly configured Access Control 
Lists in the AD server, and Binding with minimum privileges are also 
essential. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Whilst many different vulnerabilities and threats exist, they can nearly all 
be protected against by a few common countermeasures: 
• Encrypt and authenticate messages that pass over insecure networks by 
using either SSL or IPsec 
• Always have the Application Server Bind to the Active Directory using 
the same or lower privileges than those possessed by the client 
• Ensure that the Access Control Lists in the AD server are correctly 
configured to give minimum privileges to clients. 
• Severely limit the number and scope of directory operations that the 
Application Server sends to the AD server on behalf of the client. Always 
try to restrict the range of parameters that can be set or chosen by the 
client, and validate all user input fields for their content. If possible, 
ensure that no Modification operations are ever sent. 
• Restrict the error diagnostic messages that are returned to the client. 
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With these countermeasures in place, it will significantly reduce the risk 
that an attacker will be able to launch a successful STRIDE attack against an 
Active Directory server. 
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